Decision Date: September 8, 2005

Panel: Cindy Derkaz

Keywords: Wildlife Act ss. 2(1)-(5), 19; Wildlife Permit Regulation; ss. 2 (k) (i) and (ii), (p), 6 (1) (a), (b), and (d) (i) and (ii), (2), (3) (i) and (ii), and (4); hide possession, average price, hide ownership.

Ken Olynyk appealed a decision by the Regional Manager, Environmental Stewardship Division, Cariboo Region (the “Regional Manager”) refusing to issue Mr. Olynyk a permit to possess a cougar hide.  Mr. Olynyk had killed the cougar after it had killed his family’s pet dog.  After the Regional Manager issued his decision, Mr. Olynyk purchased the hide at a Government auction for $150.

The Regional Manager had refused the permit on the basis that the average value of cougar hides at auction exceeded $200, and therefore, was precluded from issuing a permit by virtue of section 6(1)(d) of the Wildlife Permit Regulation (the “Regulation”).  Section 6(2) of the Regulation requires the Regional Manager to determine the value of the hide based on the average price the Government received at auction for parts of similar species over the past three years.  The Regional Manager did not explain, in his decision, how he had determined the average value of the hide.  However, the Board found that Mr. Olynyk bore the onus of establishing that value, and that he had not done so.  Although Mr. Olynyk purchased the hide for $150, the Board found that there was no evidence that the amount reflected the average value of a cougar hide at the time of Mr. Olynyk’s application to possess the hide.  Rather, the Board found that the purchase amount was only evidence of one sale made after the Regional Manager’s decision.

Even if the value of the hide was determined to be less than $200, section 6(1)(b) of the Regulation prohibits the Regional Manager from issuing a permit if the wildlife was killed for the protection of life or property unless “special circumstances” existed in the case.  Mr. Olynyk submitted that his family should be given the hide for the loss of their pet.  However, the Board found that there was not sufficient evidence before it to conclude that there were special circumstances in this case.